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4Abstract
This report invest igates whether Public Pri vate Partnership (PPP) is a suitable approach to tackle 
global security issues, with special reference to sensit ive informat ion sharing in the context of 
critical infrastructures protection. T o this aim, i t ou tlines the PPP concept starting from it s 
introduction in the early nineties, and provides a critical view on the quest ions that arise in many 
application areas of PPP . An overview of the current EU guidelines concerning PPP is provided. 
Concerning securit y in formation sharing, early and current attempt s to apply PPP are summarised, 
and the open issues invo lved highlighted.
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61 Introduction
The term Public-private partnership (PPP) has been associated in the last decades to ventures 
(mainly public services) funded and operated through a partnership of government and one or more 
private sector organisations. The concept of PPP has evo lved and changed in the last decade, at 
times referring to different kinds of organisatio nal arrangements, ty pe o f st akeholders and 
participation arrangements, financial provisions, and focus of the activit ies.
When first used as a concept, i t was understood that typical PPP arrangements took place where the 
private sector supplie d infrastructure assets and services tradit ionally provided by governments. 
However, many sorts of collaborations between public bodies, such as local authorit ies or central 
government, and private companies tends nowadays to be referred to as public -private partnership 
[Wikipedia, PPP: 2007-08] [Primer, 2008]. 
In so me t ypes of PPP , the government uses tax revenue to provide capital for invest ment, wi th 
operations run jointly wit h the private sector or under contract. In other ty pes (Private Finance 
Initiative), capital invest ment is made by the private sector based on a contract with government to 
provide agreed services. Government contributions to a PPP are often in kind (notably the transfer 
of existing assets). Some authors consider the presence of external financing as a necessar y 
condition; others focus specifically on design-build-finance-operate arrangements.
The spread of meanings attached to the term is quite significant, paving the way to imprecision and 
misunderstandings. Public private partnership is a relat ively new concept (pressures that lead to its 
introduction date back to the economic dislocation of the late sevent ies and eighties) but its 
applications grew up extensively and st imulated a lively debate about the economic effect iveness of 
PPP together with several research strands in econo mics since then. Early in t his decade, this also  
motivated the European Commissio n to try and provi de a reference fr amework for PPP in its 
member states. (REF)
PPP has been extensively applied to public services implying large capital investments like public 
transports, for then being used in other service sectors, like healt h services and healt h care 
programs. Its appl ication to securit y info rmation sharing is recent a: it was pio neered in the US in 
1996 wi th InfraGard, an FBI init iative to address physical and cyber threats to crit ical 
infrastructures, with the goal to promote dialogue and timely co mmunication between private 
stakeholders and the FBI, so as to give InfraGard members t imely access to informat ion t hat 
enables them to protect their assets, and in turn give the government informat ion useful to prevent 
terrorism and other crimes. In recent years InfraGard wa s quest ioned on ground o f 
unconstitutionality, appearing as an attempt to turn private -sector corporations into surrogate eyes 
and ears for the federal services.
This report is mainly based on a literature compilation fro m the press and other open commo nplace 
sources, so as to provide a broad picture of PPP and it s security related applicat ions and pinpo int 
elements to evaluate whether public private partnership is a suitable approach to tackle glo bal 
security issues. In Chapter 2 the PPP concept is outline d starting fro m it s introduction in the early 
nineties, early and current attempts to apply PPP are summarised, and a view of the quest ions that  
arise in many applicat ion areas of PPP is given. Chapter 3 shows as the EC tried to face the key 
questions by p roviding guidelines concerning risk assessment and negotiat ion o f PPP agreements. 
In the final chapter, we focus on applicat ion of PPP in the securit y arena, and try to highlight the 
open issues involved.
72 The concept of PPP: history, main application areas, 
open issues
2.1 PPP history
Pressure to change the standard model of Public Procurement arose init ially fro m co ncerns about 
the level of public debt, which grew rapidly during the macroeconomic dislocat ion of the 1970s and 
1980s. Although the init ial concept that private provisio n o f in frastructure represented a way of 
providing infrastructure at no cost to the public has now been generally abandoned, the interest in 
alternatives to the standard model o f public procurement persisted. In particular, it has bee n argued 
that m odels invo lving an enhanced ro le fo r the private sector, with a single private sector 
organisation t aking responsibilit y fo r most aspects of service provisio ns fo r a given pro ject, could 
yield an improved allocation of risk, while maintaining public accountability for essential aspects of 
service provision [Wikipedia PPP, 2007-08].
Initially, most public -private partnerships were negotiated individually , as one -off deals. In 1992, 
however, the Conservat ive government of John Major in the Unit ed Kingdo m int roduced the 
Private Finance Init iative (PFI), the first systematic program aimed at encouraging public -private 
partnerships. In the 1992 program, the main focus was on reducing the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement, al though the effect on t he public accounts was largely illusory . The Labour 
government of Tony Blair, elected in 1997, persisted with the PFI but sought to shift the emphasis 
to the achievement of ‘value for money’ mainly through an appropriate allocation of risk [ibidem].
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) immediately proved controversial, as it was perceived by crit ics 
within the Labour party as a back -door form o f pr ivatisation [ Wikipedia: PFI, 2007 -08].  
Nonetheless, the Treasury found the scheme advantageous and pushed Labo ur to adopt i t after the 
1997 General Elect ion. Hence PFI has cont inued and, indeed, expanded under Labour . Under PFI, 
contractors pay for the construction costs and then rent the finished project back to the public sector 
[BBC News, 2003]. 
Critics against PFI have raised the following po ints:
· Taxpayers will in the end pay even more with privat isation. According to a survey 
conducted by the Labour Research Department, the 'rent' for PFI projects in the healt h 
service alone will top £13bn. There are also ca ses such as the Fazackerly prison in 
Liverpool, where the init ial cost of the project has been paid back within two years, 
leaving 23 years of pure profit from the construction. 
· The only way co mpanies can turn a pro fit is by cutting emplo yees' wages and b enefits. 
Unions talk of jobs being 'privatised'. Their members are shifted into the private sector , 
where they have fewer emplo yment rights and benefits. 
· Some early PFI projects were not up to standards, and there are also cases where PPP 
proved a failure , like one o f t he mo st fam ous privatisat ions under the Conservative 
government, Brit ish Rail. Railtrack - responsible for track, signals and stations - had to 
be taken into administration by Labour amid huge debts, and the rail network may in 
future be run by a not-for-profit company [ibidem].
Controversy is also caused by the o ff-balance-sheet nature of PFI contracts. Under UK account ing, 
the PFI company does not enjo y t he risks and rewards of the building - the government carries 
demand risk, for example - so the building is not shown on its balance sheet. Instead its main asset 
8is the finance debtor - the lo ng term contractual obligat ion of the government to pay for the 
building. For the government account ing, the fact that it pays a single charge (the 'U nitary Charge') 
for both the building and its maintenance is sufficient for it to be classed as a revenue item, so 
neither the building or the lo ng-term obligation t o pay appear o f t he government's balance sheet. 
Were the total PFI liabilit y shown on the U K balance sheet - as would be required under UK 
accounting standards - the government's finance would look somewhat different [W ikipedia: PFI, 
2007-08].
Advocates of PPP say that many hospitals and schools would not be built at all if it w ere not for 
private fi nance, as public mo ney was simply no t available. They claim that PFI will lead to a 
dramatic increase in the qualit y of public services. Performance -related penalt ies that are now built  
into m ost PFI contracts will ensure a cont inuing improvement in s tandards, far in advance o f 
anything that could be achieved in the public sector , they argue. The government has staked its 
reputation on delivering better public services but it is also aware that there is a limit on how far 
taxes can be raised. PFI is a fast, effective - and in the short term at least - cheap way of getting new 
facilities built. The biggest hospital -building programme in living memory is current ly u nderway 
thanks to PFI Local authorit ies are increasingly being steered towards PPP [BBC New s, 2003]. 
There are some areas where public -private schemes may ult imately prove unsuitable. Some PFI 
projects, such as Capita's managing o f the housing benefit system in Lambeth and so me IT projects, 
have already proved disastrous. But the government is h oping that the current hospital and schoo l 
building programme will demonstrate to sceptics - and the unions - that it is the only way to revamp 
the country's ailing public services [ibidem].
2.2 PPP application sectors
A g rowing number of countries showed interest in fo llowing the most advanced administrations o n 
the topi c: Australia (Partnership V ictoria) and the U.K. (Private Finance Init iative). Developing 
countries, in part icular, try to develop PPPs to address econo mic infrastructure bottlenecks. 
However, the trend is universal: a recent study of PPPs in Europe found that between 1990 and 
2005, more than a thousand partnerships had been signed in the European Unio n alone, representing 
an investment of almost 200 € billions [Primer, 2008]. 
In summary , the PPP concept has found wi de applicat ion especially in infrastructural pro jects, 
typically roads, schools, prisons and hospi tals, but i t is not limited to such sectors. For instance, a 
recent study by Delo itte [2007] provi des a view of the way public -private partnership is used to 
close the infrastructure gap worldwide. The study provides an overview o f significant PPP projects 
worldwide, an analysis of major drawbacks on past PPP projects and recommendations about the 
way governments and public authorit ies should manage such projec ts. Application areas range fro m 
Transport to W ater and wastewater , Educati on, Hospi tals, Defense, Public Housing land and 
Development.  Major applications in the EU are reported in chapter 4.
According to the Primer [2008], major applications of PPP in th e US include Public infrastructures, 
like the State Route 125, San Diego, California, the Central Park, New Y ork Ci ty, the Chicago 
Skyway Bridge and the redevelopment of downtown Chattanooga, T ennessee fro m t he mid -1980s 
to present, but also Innovative Tec hnologies, like the California Fuel Cell Partnership (CaFCP), 
Finance (the Federal Reserve) and Security (InfraGard - which is a main focus of Chapter 4 of this 
report).
Finally, the concept may also be applied to Public Social Private Partnerships (PSPP), defined as 
enterprises having social purpose , i .e. carrying out acti vities for the protection, support and 
improvement of opportunit ies for disadvantaged people, and implemented in partnership between 
public, purely commercial and social economic organizations and/or enterprises. 
In fact, some large international healt h care programs may be considered public -private 
9partnerships, e.g.: The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizat ion is financed per 75% (750 
Mio.US$) by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundat ion.
As a UN agency , the W orld Heal th Organisation is financed through the UN system by 
contributions fro m me mber states. In recent years, the WHO's work has invo lved more 
collaboration with NGOs and the pharmaceutical industry [Wikipedia PPI 2007-08].
2.3 The debate on PPP
Because o f t he focus on avoiding increases in public debt, many private infrastructure projects in 
the early 1990s invo lved provisio n of services at substant ially higher cost than could have been 
achieved under the standard model o f public p rocurement. The central problem was that private 
investors demanded and received a rate of return that was higher than the government’ s bond rate, 
even though most or all of the inco me r isk associated with the pro ject was borne by the public 
sector [Wikipedia, PPP: 2007-08]. Although the general view that governments should seek "value 
for m oney" has been widely accepted, there have been cont inuing disputes over whether the 
guidelines designed to achi eve these goal s are appropri ate, and whether they have be en correctly 
applied in particular cases. Much o f the discussion has been based on debates over the UK Private 
Finance Initiative.
In the main, experts still argue about [Primer, 2008]:
· the proper definition of PPP
· their microeconomic foundat ions
· their possible role as an antidote to the worldwide downturn in infrastructure invest ment
The research literature on PPPs fo llows various strands. One, fo llowing Schleifer [1998] in the 
comparison o f t he respect ive interests of private and public ownerships, under lines the ro les o f 
potential cost reduction leading to non-contractible deterioration of quality; innovation; competition 
and consumer cho ice; reputation mechanisms 1; and government’s credibilit y (non versat ility). Its  
results are confirmed by another stra nd o f lit erature, following a model pio neered by Hart [2002] 
and focusing on the advantage of contracts bundling construction and operation. Consensus 
currently crystallizes on a few singular points [Primer, 2008]:
PPPs to be limited to projects delivering greater Value for Money than other forms of procurement 
· the contractibility of the quality of service 
· the transfer of a significant share of risks to the private sector 
· the presence of competition or incentive-based regulations 
· a sound inst itutional and legal framework 
· a sufficient level of technical expert ise in the government
· the proper di sclosure of PPP co mmitments, al ong wi th government guarantees, in 
government financial statements.
In conclusio n, consequences o f t he generalizat ion of PPPs are ye t far fro m clear . The debate 
especially focuses on the fiscal aspects:
· accounting and off-budget spending 
  
1 potential loss of reputation because a partner reneges an agreement is a significant risk involved in PPPs. Partners 
often have different objectives when forming a partnership. If  the common goal of the partnership is not defined 
clear enough, there is significant risk that one of the partners may renege the agreement when its expectations are no 
longer met.
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· adequate control procedures 
· best systems to negotiate and manage PPP contracts.
The following chapter overviews the state of affairs in the EU and f ocuses on the guidelines issued 
by the EC on these latter subjects.
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3 PPP in the European Union: the EC guidelines 2003 
and EC Communication C(2007) 6661
The quoted study by Delo itte [2007] analyses several applicat ion sectors for PPP worldwide and 
stresses among other the following major areas of applicat ion of PPP in the EU:
· Transport. 
o "Spain and Italy have considerable experience using PPPs for roads. 
o Most of the exist ing toll highways in Spain were put out to concessio n in t he 
1960s.43 T oday, the govern ment hopes to use PPPs to fund one -third ($1 13 
billion) of the est imated invest ment needed in road and rail between 2006 and 
2020.44. 
o Similarly, the transportati on sector m akes up the bulk of PPPs in Italy (with a 
value of $11.4 billion)".
· Water and wastewater. 
o "The largest European water PPP is in the Netherlands, where the Water Board of 
Delft land awarded a 30 -year concessio n, wi th a total contract val ue of €1.58 
billion. The proj ect includes the design, construction, and operation of a new 
wastewater treatment plan and, to comply wit h mo re stri ngent di scharge 
requirements, the refurbishment and operation of an exis ting wastewater 
treatment plant".
· Education. 
o "The United Kingdom is ho me to the world’s largest and mo st sophisticated PPP 
schools program. Most new school s and terti ary education inst itutions are built  
under the PFI or som e of i ts variants. All in all, nearly 100 educat ion PFI deals 
valued at £3.5 billion have been signed. Over the next 10 –15 years, every school 
in Britain will be brought up to 21st century standards through a program called 
Building Schools for the Future. A $ 37 billio n investment in new buildings and 
refurbishment will be delive red through a combinat ion of jo int venture models 
and more tradit ional design -and-build contracts, informat ion t echnology and 
communication contracts, and facilities management contracts".
· Hospitals. 
o "Since 1997, 85 percent of funds for major UK National Health Service projects 
have come under the PFI scheme. The total number of PFI hospital projects, 130, 
dwarfs the 12 publicly funded hospital pro jects developed during that time.
o In Portugal, 31 hospitals will be built using PPPs. The entire program, at an 
estimated cost of $37 billion, should be complete by 2014, with 10 new hospitals 
launched in 2006".
· Public Housing land and Development. 
o "The country with the deepest experience in this sector remains the Netherlands, 
which has been applying PPPs to so cial housing and regenerat ion projects for 
nearly two decades. Joint venture, the most commonly used PPP arrangement for 
these projects, suits the local governments’ need to retain control over planning 
and development while ut ilizing the private partners’ available resources and 
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expertise. PPP contracts typically last for 5 to 10 years, after which the land 
owner (the government or the private partner) takes ownership o f t he project. 
This model proved quite successful for more than 100 locally init iated projects in 
the Netherlands".
· Defense. 
o "The UK Ministry of Defense has emplo yed various PPP models for more than 
56 defense pro jects—everything fro m bu ilding military acco mmodations to 
training personnel to putting up satellites. Total value: £4.65 billion.60 
o The German defense ministry has likewise init iated a number o f inno vative 
defense PPPs. An Army maintenance jo int venture with HIL GmbH invo lves the 
entire value chain for 10,000 combat systems (not including system purchase) ".
This wealth o f applicat ion sectors and areas – together with the many crit icisms and concerns that 
wide adoption of PPP had caused, as seen in Chapter 2 – motivated the EC to formulate appropriate 
guidelines [2003] to ease analysis o f t he inherent risks related to this t ype of fu nding and provide 
guidance about how to perform negotiation between public authorit ies and potenti al private 
partners. 
Later on in 2005, on the basis of a Green Paper (IP/04/593), the European Co mmission has 
launched a debate on the desirabilit y o f adapt ing the Co mmunity rules on public procurement and 
concessions to accommodate the development of public -private partnerships (PPPs). The main 
objective was to see whether it is necessary to improve the current rules in order to ensure that 
economic operators have access to PPPs under condit ions of legal clarit y and real competit ion. 
Further consultat ion amo ng concerned parties has brought the EC to an interpretative 
Communication [C(2007) 6661] concerning Public Procurem ent and Concessions to 
Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (IPPP).
3.1 The EC Guidelines 2003 
The Services o f t he European Commissio n have a particular interest in PPPs in view o f t he grants 
they provide within the context of Cohesion and Structural Funds and o f the Structural Po licies for 
PreAccession. In March 2003 the Directorate General Regional Policy of the European Commission  
- in consultation wit h the other concerned services of the EC - issued the Guidelines for Successful 
Public-Private Partnerships. Those guidelines ident ify four principal roles for the private sector in 
PPP schemes:
· to provide additional capital
· to provide alternative management and implementation skills
· to provide value added to the consumer and the public at large
· to provide better ident ification of needs and optimal use of resources
The Guidelines point out four key issues influencing the design of projects and their 
implementation. Alt hough these are characteristic of grant financing in general, in view o f 
cooperation with the European Commissio n t heir reco gnition and integration at an early stage 
facilitates project acceptance by the EC and more effect ive implementation:
1. ensure open market access and competition. A k ey requirement of Commissio n financing is 
that PPPs should neither impact on open market ope ration nor on the clear and transparent 
rules of these markets. This is particularly relevant to tendering and select ion procedures, 
the grant purpose and provisions for contract renewal (especially about the length o f 
concession agreements).
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2. protect public interest and maximise value added. This requirement impacts in many forms 
over project design, scope and implementation. EC grants require that local public partners 
adopt European norms, qualit y and performance standards and effect ive mo nitoring and 
management. Public interest is to be taken into account concerning tender, evaluat ion and 
contracting (e.g. by re -negotiating a grant so as to sustain local capacit y if required). The 
important role for the public must be recognised by encouraging the creat ion of independent 
consumer groups and associations acting as watchdogs.
3. define the right level of grant financing. The EC must ensure that its grants match real 
needs, so as to ensure financial efficiency and optimal use of limited funds. Grants must not 
constitute inco mpatible state aids. A f urther concern is to achieve balance between 
facilitating project realisation and limit ing undue private sector’s profits from grants. 
4. select the most suitable PPP type. The degree of private invo lvement must match the
objectives of the project and the needs o f t he public. A detailed cost/benefit assessment of 
private sector involvement vs. public alternat ives must be undertaken to ensure that PPP 
enhance public benefit. Appropriateness, cost, abilit y o f e ffectively implement and manage 
should be the paramount considerat ions in select ing a PPP structure.
The Guidelines present five thematic parts dealing with:
· PPP structures, suitability and success factors. Four broad categories of PPP structures are 
presented, each with increasing degrees of private sector invo lvement.
· Legal and regulatory structures. The legal environment for PPP projects is defined, in view 
of the existing legal provisions at the Community, national, regional and municipal level.
· Financial and economic Implications of PPPs. This part addresses the topic o f r isk 
management and its financial impact on a project. Several techniques and considerat ions are 
presented for determining and assessing value.
· Integrating grant financing and PPP objectives. The relative strengths and weaknesses o f 
grant financing are assessed in view of the opportunit ies offered. The ability to use grants in 
a PPP depends on the abilit y t o meet the constraints and provide sufficient safeguards to 
protect the grant providers’ objectives.
· Conception, planning and implementation of PPPs. This part considers the PPP project  
cycle wi th the objective of providing a detailed discussio n o f t he issues encountered and 
possible solutions, in view of the key issues presented above.
3.2 The Green Paper IP/04/593 and the EC Communication C(2007)6661 
on Public Procurement 
Following the broad adoption of PPP in many member states, it was considered necessary to 
explore how procurement law applies to the different forms o f PPP, in order to assess whether there 
was a need to clarify, complement or improve the current legal framework at the European level. 
To this end, on 30 April 2004, the Co mmission adopted a Green Paper on Public Private 
Partnerships and Co mmunity Law on Public Contracts and Concessio ns (IP/04/593). The Green 
Paper focused on the cho ice of a private partner by a public authorit y: this must be made in 
accordance with Community rules on the awarding of public contracts. 
However, there was no specific system under Communit y la w for PPPs an d the Co mmunity r ules 
on awarding public contracts were applied to PPPs with differing degrees of intensit y. The Green 
Paper set out the scope of Communit y rul es, wi th a view to identifying any uncertainties and 
assessing to what extent Community intervention might be necessary.
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Respondents to the public consultation asked to clarify specifically two issues:
· Institutionalised PPPs: how EU rules should apply concerning the cho ice of private 
partners in “inst itutionalised PPPs” (IPPPs), i.e. public service u ndertakings held jo intly by 
both a public and a private partner
· Concessions: what i s meant by ‘concessio ns’ and the rules applicable to their award. 
Respondents expressed support to a legislative initiative of the EC in this regard.
A l egislative init iative was deemed to be the preferable option to clarify the issues po inted out by 
the public consultation. Following further in-depth analysis, including an Impact Assessment, which 
was carried out in 2006, on 5 February 2008 the Commissio n adopted the Interpr etative 
Communication C(2007)6661 [EC 2007] on the applicat ion of Co mmunity law on Public 
Procurement and Concessio ns to Institutionalised Public -Private Partnerships (IPPP).  This 
Communication defines PPPs as ‘arrangements which typically involve complex legal and financial 
arrangements involving private operators and public authorities developed in several areas of the 
public sector and widely used within the EU, in particular in transport, public health, public safety, 
waste management and water distribution’. 
The Co mmunication explains the EC rules to comply with when private partners are chosen for 
IPPP. Depending on the nature of the task (public contract or concessio n) to be attributed to the 
IPPP, ei ther the Public Procurement Directives or the gen eral EC Treat y pr inciples apply to the 
selection procedure of the private partner. 
The Co mmunication expresses the view o f t he Commission that under Co mmunity law ,  one 
tendering procedure suffices when IPPP are set up. The Communicat ion also states that as a matter 
of principle IPPP must remain wit hin the scope of their init ial object and cannot obtain any further 
public contracts or concessio ns without a procedure respecting Co mmunity law on public contracts 
and concessions. 
However, it is acknowledged that IPPP are usually set up to provide services over a fairly lo ng 
period and must, thus, be able to adjust to certain changes in the econo mic, legal or technical 
environment. The Communicat ion explains the condit ions under which these developments could 
be taken into account. 
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4 PPP & Security
Since the late ’90s, when cybersecurity threats were first recognised to be a major challenge against  
critical infrastructures 2, i t was clear the need to find proper means for connect ing the public 
dimension of the problem (related to the safety and security of society, but also to the deployment of 
needed infrastructural services), wit h the private one (both concerning the owners and operators of 
infrastructures, for the most part private, and the end users).
The first reaction across the globe was to establish links between co mpanies and governments,. In 
the United States, a Partnership for Crit ical Infrastructure Securi ty was launched by President 
Clinton on February 15, 2000 to maximize cooperation between governme nt and private sector 
initiatives for cyber -security. Since the vast majority of the United States crit ical infrastructures are 
owned and operated by private industry , the main mot ivation fo r such Partnership was simple: 
‘recognizing that the Federal government could not protect these infrastructures alone nor assure 
the delivery of services over them’ [White House, 2000].  This strategy was later confirmed under 
the Bush presidency [White House, 2003], [White House, 2007]. 
The use of the term “partnership” in this context differs radically fro m those provided in the context 
of infrastructure privatisation [Wikipedia PPI 2007-08, Primer 2008]. From 2000 on, the PPP label 
begun to be attached to all t ypes o f int eractions between public and private act ions in the securit y 
field, and became the de facto standard. This label doesn't seem to convey any specific connotation, 
and it doesn't link with the legal and polit ical use of the term unt il now: 
"State, local, and tribal governments carry out their counterterrorism responsibilities within 
the broader context of their core mission to protect the public's health and safety and to 
provide emergency and non-emergency services… Success in these endeavours depends on a 
strong partnership with the public, built on a foundation of communication and trust 
between local officials and the members of their community" [White House, 2007].
Uncertainty a bout what is meant by PPP in the securit y context results in potential misconcept ions 
of the roles and responsibilit ies o f t he different actors: what is expected from them, which are the 
liabilities and obligations, which can be the legal effects of certain activit ies, etc. This situation asks 
for further reflect ion as a superficial use of the term might undermine the init iatives making use o f 
the concept.  
Nevertheless nowadays, the majorit y of developed countries declare to  foster PPP as a way to cope 
with challenges against infrastructure securit y t hrough dedicated programmes, like InfraGard 
[1996-2008] in the US and EPCIP [EC, 2004, 2006] in the European Union. 
Historically, two m ain mot ivations were advocated for sustaining the adoption o f public private 
partnership schemes in the security arena: 
1. Public and private partners derive a co mmon benefit fro m co llaboration: ty pically, they 
achieve stronger securit y by sharing sensit ive informat ion and data concerning the 
assets/business under their responsibilit y. Partners involved may be working in (and across) 
different sectors, like:
· process industries (power, gas, oil, util ities, etc.) making use of the same monitoring 
  
2 I.e. infrastructures providing key services upon which global security and economy depend, as well as the well -being 
of the citizens. According to the EC [2004] critical infrastructures ‘consist of those physical and information technology 
facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, 
safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in the Member States’.
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and control devices, and manufacturers of these same systems and devices;
· stakeholders (suppliers, end users, regulators, etc.) in a given business, e.g. power, 
gas and water distribution. 
2. Public and private partners actually share the burden o f t aking jo int decisions (usually 
referred as governance) because they have co mmon responsibilit y upon an asset, like a 
critical infrastructure. They need to cope with security risks, jointly respond to incidents and 
manage crises by coordinat ing their actions. Collaboration may invo lve asset owners and 
operators, police forces and civil protection, and concern diverse activit ies like risk analysis, 
pre-emptive defense/surveillance measures,  territorial control, counter terrorism operations, 
crisis management, control under emergency , restoration etc., and shall take place under a 
legal and regulatory framework where respective responsibilit ies are well defined by the 
government bodies in charge (e.g. the ministry of inte rnal affairs and the regulat ing 
authorities in charge).
Nowadays, many such securit y-related collaborati ons al ready take place am ong partners at the 
national and international level; they may eit her be sporadic and due to specific events/init iatives, or 
be continuous and take place within a co mmon framework and/or well defined internat ional 
agreements. 
The two different motivat ions above bear so me cont inuity in between, because informat ion sharing 
may actually lead to jo int risk analysis, and this to poi nting out and recognising the need for a 
stronger operational coordination. Thus, we may say that data and information sharing stands on the 
lower end of a spectrum, because it is a pre -condition to stronger collaboration: in fact, currently 
security r elated data is scarce, dramat ically insufficient. W ithout data about vulnerabilit ies, 
incidents, etc., no effective assessment, no management, no assurance is possible. 
On the other hand, gathering securit y-related data is hard: sources are diverse and scattere d, crucial 
information may be missing, make analysis difficult and co mpromise objective co mparison.  
Moreover, there may be several obstacles to distribut ion and jo int analysis o f s ecurity related 
information:
· stakeholders play different roles (e.g. regula tors, owners and operators). They have 
jurisdictional limits. They may be competitors. All this inevitably leads to different attitudes 
and standpoints which reflect into different security concepts and languages; 
· sharing security sensitive data raises legal concerns for two orders of reasons: 
· disclosing vulnerabilit ies may co mpromise classified informat ion and put at ri sk company 
assets and business; fair co mpetition can be endangered.
· associating private companies to public authorities in any programme related with gathering 
security r elated informat ion would bring the former to surrogate state responsibilit ies and 
may be deemed to vio late civil rights on many grounds.
These difficult ies may be enhanced when public and private partners have to agree upon liabilities 
and cost of security measures [Andersson and Malm, 2006]. 
Furthermore, although the concept of PPP remains rather fuzzy, it remains to be seen whether it can 
really be stretched so as to apply to partnerships of any kind between public author ities and private 
partners in the area of security. 
It is clear, for instance, that simple agreements amo ng public and private partners in order to share 
security r elevant data do not easily fit wit h t he commo nly understood m eaning o f PPP as a 
‘government service or private business venture which is funded and operated through a 
partnership of government and one or more private sector companies’ [Wikipedia PPI 2007-08] and 
may hardly fit even the broader definit ion contained in the interpretative Co mmunication C(2007) 
6661: "complex legal and financial arrangements involving private operators and public 
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authorities in several areas of the public sector, in particular in transport, public health, public 
safety, waste management and water distribution".
4.1 Security Information Sharing and Analysis about Critical 
Infrastructures: the ISACs and the WARPs
4.1.1 ISACS in the USA
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are US vo luntary organisations which group 
together stakeho lders in a given sector (e.g. Communication, Electricity, Emergency Management 
and Response, Financial Services, Highway and Information T echnology) and federal 
administrations in order to facilitate vo luntary collaboration and informat ion sharing amo ng it s 
participants. The object ive o f t he I SACs is to gather information on vulnerabilit ies, threats, 
intrusions, and ano malies fro m sector industries, government, and other sources, and prompt ly 
disseminate threat indications, analyses, and warnings, together with interpretations, to assist the 
sector participants take protective actions. 
ISACs were established on the turn of the century when threats against US crit ical infrastructures 
became apparent. For instance, the NCC -ISAC, which was designated as the ISAC for 
telecommunications, commenced operations on March 1, 2000. The init ial membership was based 
on Nati onal Co mmunication Center (NCC) membership, which reflected a broader base o f 
technologies comprising the telecommunications infrastructure. 
The NCC is one o f t he services o f t he Nat ional Communications System (NCS), an office within 
the United States Department of Ho meland Security charged wit h enabling nat ional securit y and 
emergency preparedness co mmunications. The genesis of the NCS dates back to the sixt ies, after 
the Cuban missile cr isis when co mmunications problems amo ng the United States, the Union of 
Soviet Soci alist Republics, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and foreign heads of state 
threatened to com plicate the crisis further . After 40 years wit h t he US Secretary of Defe nse, the 
NCS was transferred by President Bush to the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.
The White House report [2007] confirms that informat ion sharing wit h t he private sector about 
Critical Infrastructures security remains a basic strategy of the US government – because the private 
sector is est imated to own and operate about 85% of the US crit ical infrastructures – and quotes 
terrorist attacks on transportati on infrastructures in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) as a further 
proof of the need for strengthening co llaboration with the private sector in this area. The report 
quotes the following as key factors to motivate governmental efforts to improve information sharing 
with the private sector: 
· ‘Current, reliable, accurate, and actionable information is critical to private sector 
decisions to protect their business; 
· Private sector entities gather, process, analyze, and share information in order to protect 
their companies, assets, employees, infrastructure, and ability to operate, so as to maintain 
a competitive advantage; 
· In many cases, private sector entities have spent years establishing strong working 
relationships with Federal, State, and local law enforcement and other entities; this Strategy 
respects and encourages those established relationships; 
· The private sector operates within multiple information sharing frameworks: industry 
executives often prefer to separately share threat-related information with Federal and State 
as well as local government officials and other business executives as they assess the threat 
environment in which they operate, implement protective measures, and engage in 
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emergency response planning activities; 
· As we incorporate the information sharing needs and capabilities of the private sector into 
our efforts to enable information sharing, we need to recognize that at times the environment 
in which homeland security, law enforcement, and terrorism-related information is shared 
mirrors the regulatory environment in which the sharing entity operates; and 
· The private sector relies on multiple information sources including professional and local 
organizations, private information providers, news outlets, colleagues, open intelligence 
sources on the web, and company management in both domestic and foreign locations, in 
addition to the government at all levels (Federal, State, and local)’. 
The said report quotes a number of collaboration mechanisms to "facilitate the flow of informat ion, 
mitigate obstacles to voluntary information sharing, and provide feedback and con tinuous 
improvement regarding structure and process ". In addit ion t o ISACs, t hese include Sector 
Coordination Councils, Government Coordinatio n Councils, and a National Infrastructure 
Coordinating Center. ISACs are coordinated by the ISAC Council, whose mi ssion is to advance the 
physical and cyber securit y o f t he crit ical infrastructures of North America by establishing and 
maintaining a framework for valuable interact ion between and amo ng the ISACs and wit h 
government. 
The public counterpart of the ISAC C ouncil is the MS -ISAC (http://www.msisac.org/), a voluntary 
and collaborative organization with participation from all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. 
The missio n of the MS -ISAC is to provide a commo n me chanism for raising the level of cyber 
security readiness and response in each state and with local governments. The MS -ISAC provides a 
central resource for gathering informat ion on cyber threats to crit ical infrastructure from the states 
and providing two -way s haring o f info rmation between and among the states and with local 
government. 
Major objectives of the MS-ISAC include:
· disseminating early warnings of cyber system threats 
· sharing security incident information 
· providing trending and other analysis for security planning 
· distributing current proven security practices and suggestions 
· promoting awareness o f t he interdependencies between cyber and physical crit ical 
infrastructure, as well as between and among the different sectors. 
The MS -ISAC was launc hed in 2004 co mpliant wi th the object ives of th e National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace, established under Bush Presidency in January 2003 [White House 2003]. 
The effect iveness o f t he ISACs is rather controversial. For instance, the FS -ISAC (Financial 
Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center) proved its effect iveness in February of 2000, 
when it saved its membership from falling vict im to the widespread denial o f service attacks that 
affected much of the industry [SearchSecurity 2008]. The ES-ISAC, the Electricity Sector ISAC, is 
strongly related to a pre -existent organisation, the North American Reliabilit y Council (NERC), 
which was quite effect ive in issuing appropriate guidelines for physical and cyber securit y t o its 
members since 2002-2003 [NERC Security Guidelines 2002-2008]. 
However, a report of the Nat ional Infrastructure Advisory Council [NIAC 2004] found several 
inadequacies and drawbacks in the way ISACs were organised, and made recommendations about 
how to re-organise them, better integrate their membership and improve informat ion dissemination. 
Although the report outlined a framework for action, it did not recommend government intervent ion 
into any sector – also due to the wide difference among the various sectors. 
After the NIAC study, there is evidence that the ISAC effort was reorganised and took momentum 
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at least concerning the electricit y sector, where the NERC became the reference organisation as the 
North American ERO (Electricit y Reliabilit y Council) in charge of ensuring co mpliance of the 
sector to its security guidelines.  
4.1.2 Information exchanges and WARPs in the UK
UK launched two ty pes of organisat ions fo r dealing wit h t he sharing of information about crit ical 
infrastructure risks: informat ion exchanges and W ARPs. Though both initiatives rely upon the 
cooperation between public and private actors, their structure and funct ioning rules have no point in 
common with the definition of PPPs in t he Brit ish or European context – as described beforehand. 
In any case, they are valid exa mples o f beneficial activit ies in the securit y do main based on the 
partnership of public and private actors.
WARPs (Warning, Advice and Reporting Po int) were launched in 2005 by the NISC, the n the UK 
government authority – now absorbed by CPNI (the UK's Ce ntre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure)- which o ffered protective securit y advice to businesses and organisat ions across the 
national infrastructure, in order to provide a co mmunity based service where members can receive 
and share up -to-date advice on informat ion security threats, incidents and solut ions [WARP 2005-
08]. 
A WARP is a co mmunity based service where members can receive and share up -to-date advice on 
information securit y t hreats, incidents and so lutions. Therefore it is dependent up on the active 
participation and organisation of the community members.
A WARP is to provide three core services:
· filtered warning: where members receive only the securit y informat ion t hey need, selected 
via an on-line tick-list;
· advice brokering: where members can learn fro m other members’ initiatives and experience, 
possibly through a members’ bulletin board;
· trusted sharing: where reports are anonymised so that members can learn fro m each other ’s 
attacks & incidents, without fear of embarrassment or recrimination.
WARPs has the advantage of being able to customise its services (e.g. early warnings) to the needs 
and requi rements of the part icipants. This is in any case facilitated by a toolbox and guidelines 
provided by the NISCC/CPNI.
Contrary to the ISACs, however, the WARPs are organised either on a territorial or on a corporative 
basis. They group:
· public services
· local government
· business
· voluntary organisations. 
Penetration in business co mmunities appears however in it s early stages. Current ly t here e xists 5  
business WARPs only: 
· ANSWARP: provides WARP services for local authority users of Anite Swift software.
· BTRWARP: groups British Telecom end-users
· LS1WARP: aimed at a small co mmunity within The Law Societ y's membership centred in 
London
· NECWARP: a WARP for the private SME Sector of the North East of England
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· PENWARP: a WARP for journalists
In addit ion, the UK government has prom oted the setting up of dedicated Informati on Exchanges 
IE) in various CIP sectors. It is recognised that t hese mechanisms, although potentially very useful, 
are hard to build as they are based upon the personal mutual trust of the participants. For facilitating 
their devel opment, the sharing information is carried out in confident ial meet ing, run under a 
version of the Chatham House Rule. 
Up to the end of 2008, the following IE's have been set up:
· ADMIE 
o The Aerospace and Defence Manufacturer's Informat ion Exchange was formed in 
December 2006, to share confident ially mutually beneficial information regarding 
electronic securi ty threats in the aerospace and defence sector . The ADMIE 
comprises UK-based organisations involved in this sector. 
· FSIE 
o The UK Financial Services Informat ion Exchange was formed in February 2003, to 
share confident ially mutually beneficial information reg arding electronic securit y 
threats, vulnerabilit ies, incidents and so lutions in the UK financial sector . The FSIE 
includes members fro m U K-based financial organisat ions including banking, 
insurance, securities, service providers, exchanges and CPNI. 
· MSPIE
o The Managed Service Providers Informat ion Exchange (MSPIE) consists of 
commercial organisations that supply IT services and securit y to UK CNI customers 
in the public and private sector . The main aim is to understand risks better and 
improve securit y t o the benefit o f customers, clients, stakeho lder and UK nationa l 
security t hrough informat ion sharing and cooperation. The MSPIE achieves this by 
facilitating the sharing o f in formation in a confident ial and trusted environment  
concerning threats, vulnerabil ities and incidents of electronic attack between it s 
membership. 
· NSIE 
o The UK Network Securi ty Information Exchange (UK -NSIE) was formed in April 
2003 to share sensit ive informat ion in t he informat ion and co mmunications 
technologies sector. It currently i ncludes IP providers; core mobile operators; and 
traditional telecommunications providers, as well as CPNI. Participat ing companies 
now cover over 80% of the tel ecommunications market in the UK.  It is linked to 
NSIE in USA, of which BT is a member .  BT ac ts as the channel for informatio n 
between the two Exchanges. Under the aegis of the NSIE, a number of working 
groups have been established, and several guidance documents and technical papers 
have been produced. These include: a guide to the procurement of resilient telecoms; 
best practice guidance on the secure implementation of BGP.
· PIIE 
o Pharmaceutical Industries Informat ion Exchange was formed in September 2006 to 
share confident ially mutually beneficial information regarding electronic securit y 
threats, vulnerabilit ies, incidents and so lutions in the pharmaceut ical industry. All o f 
the PIIE m embers are fro m g lobal pharmaceutical corporations that have a
significant UK interest.
· SCSIE 
o The SCADA and Control Systems Informat ion Exchange is for those compa nies that 
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are dependent upon SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) or other 
process control or telemetry systems.  Formed in October 2003, it shares confident ial 
and mutually beneficial informat ion regarding electronic securit y t hreats, 
vulnerabilities, incidents and so lutions in the SCADA and process control 
environment.  The SCSIE includes members from UK -based energy, transport and 
water companies.  It has produced and is current ly working on good practice 
guidance.  Co mpleted guidance include s:  Implement secure architecture, 
understanding business risk, firewall deplo yment for SCADA and process contr ol 
networks to name but a few.
· TSIE
o The Transport Sector Informat ion Exchange was formed in September 2006 and 
expanded coverage of the aviat ion sector Informat ion Exchange to include other 
major transport methods.
· VSIE 
o The Vendor Security Information Exchange (VSIE) was formed in January 2005 to 
share confident ially mutually beneficial information regarding electronic securit y 
threats am ong the m ajor com panies invo lved in the ICT industry . The VSIE 
comprises members of major international companies in the ICT sector.
· SRIE 
o The Securit y Researchers Informat ion E xchange (SRIE) was formed in November 
2006 to share confident ially mutually beneficial i nformation regarding electronic 
security t hreats in the penetration test ing and securit y r esearch sector . The SRIE 
comprises of members of UK penetration testing and security research companies.
4.2 The European SCADA and Control Systems Information Exchange
The European SCADA and Control Systems Info rmation Exchange (E -SCSIE) is a Pan -European 
group designed to facilitate the exchange of informat ion between its members, in a confident ial and 
trusted environment, concerning threats, vulnerabilit ies and cyber in cidents, or any other event  
negatively affecting process control networks and environments. The E -SCSIE also deals wit h 
solutions to risks associated with process control networks and environments [SCNI 2007-08].
The E-SCSIE includes:
· national Authorities;
· industrial users of SCADA systems which provide crit ical services (electricity, oil & gas, 
water, food, transports) or run potentially hazardous processes, e.g. chemical, radiological, 
biological, and nuclear;
· research institutes working on SCADA security technologies.
The E -SCSIE was started in 2004 by an init iative o f t he NISCC, the former UK Nat ional 
Information Securit y Co -ordination Centre 3, after they organised a successful SCADA Security 
Conference in London (May 2004),with the support of other Eur opean governmental agencies and 
the Joint Research Centre of the European Co mmission. It is current ly chaired by the European 
Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) and the Swedish Energy Management Agency (SEMA).
The E -SCSIE has held ten meet ings since June 2005, although its Membership Guidelines were 
initially set in June 2007 only , after long consult ation among the partners. These set the terms o f 
reference and the membership criteria of the group. Moreover strict rules for joining the E -SCSIE 
  
3 Today CPNI, Center for the Protection of the Critical Infrastructures
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were established, which prescribe among other that unanimity is required to accept a new entry, and 
for informat ion exchange amo ng partners: in order to create a confidently high level o f t rust 
between the members, all members adhere to the Traffic Light Protocol [ibidem], [Freedictionary 
2008], established in the last century for face -to-face meetings among British officers. 
Information sharing includes
· discussions on the many good practice guides , standards and reco mmendations on Contro l 
System Cyber Security, and their application to existing and future control systems;
· the exchange of incidents and the discussio n on possible mit igations ;
· the provision of a forum to  exchange informat ion between governmental bodies and end -
users on e.g. regulations, joint initiatives , etc.;
· the distribution of information being discussed in regional informat ion exchange groups.
The long period between the earlier meet ings and the acceptance o f t he membership guidelines is 
significant of how difficult is to gain trust among pu blic authorit ies and private partners, especially 
in an internat ional setting.
4.3 InfraGard and TIPS
According to its website InfraGard [1996 -2008] is ‘an informat ion sharing and analysis effort 
serving the interests and co mbining the knowledge base of a wide range of members. At its mo st 
basic level, InfraGard is a partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigat ion and the private 
sector. InfraGard is an associat ion of businesses, academic inst itutions, state and local law 
enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing informat ion and intelligence to 
prevent hostile acts against the United States’. 
InfraGard is a Public -private partnership that began in the Cleveland, Ohio, FBI field Office in 
1996, init ially as a local effort to gain support fro m t he information techno logy industry and 
academia for the FBI's invest igative efforts in the cyber arena. The program then expanded to other 
FBI Field Offices, and in 1998 the FBI assigned nat ional program responsibilit y t o th e former 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). In 2003 responsibilit y passed to the FBI's Cyber 
Division. While under the direction of NIPC, the focus o f InfraGard was cyber infrastructure 
protection. After September 11, 2001 NIPC expanded its efforts to include physical as well as cyber 
threats to critical infrastructures, and InfraGard’s mission expanded accordingly. 
The authoritative White House report on the US National Strategy For Information Sharing [2007] 
confirms that InfraG ard is a key US nat ional secu rity programme. T he goal of InfraGard is ‘to 
promote ongoing dialogue and timely communication between members and the FBI. InfraGard 
members gain access to information that enables them to protect their assets and in turn give 
information to government that facilitates its responsibilities to prevent and address terrorism and 
other crimes’ [InfraGard, 1996-2008]. Its objectives include:
· increasing the level o f info rmation and reporting between InfraGard members and the FBI 
on matters related to counterterrorism, cyber crime and other major crime programs;
· increasing interact ion and informat ion sharing among InfraGard members and the FBI 
regarding threats to the critical infrastructures, vulnerabilities, and interdependencies;
· providing members with value-added threat advisories, alerts, and warnings;
· promoting effective liaison with local, state and federal agencies; 
· providing members a forum for educat ion and training on counterterrorism, 
counterintelligence cyber crime and other matters relevant to infor med reporting of potential 
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crimes and attacks on the nation and US interests [ibidem]. 
According to Wikipedia [2004-‘08] since 2003, InfraGard Alliances and the FBI claimed ‘to have 
developed a Trust -based PPP to ensure reliabilit y and integrit y of inform ation exchanged about 
various terrorism, intelligence, criminal, and securi ty matters. (InfraGard) supports FBI priorit ies in 
the areas of counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, and cybercrime’. 
Early in 2008, the journal The Progressive started a campaign against InfraG ard claiming that it  
would surrogate state powers in the event of mart ial law . Both the FBI and members of the 
InfraGard alliances have responded that this is untrue, and that InfraGard have no law enforcement  
powers of any kind.  The Progressive echoed and revived the concerns expressed earlier in 2004 by 
the ACLU, the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU 2004]. 
The main o bjective o f t he ACLU Report [2004] is to show that ‘information -age technol ogy, 
anaemic privacy laws and soarin g profits have all combined to endanger privacy rights to a point 
never before seen in [the US] history’. The Report comments about the many public private 
surveillance endeavours created after 9/1 1, arguing that they might create a ‘surveillance -industrial 
complex’ endangering civil libert ies in the US: ‘there is a lo ng and unfortunate history of 
cooperation between government securit y agencies and powerful corporations to deprive 
individuals o f t heir privacy and other civil libert ies’. The Report quotes a nd comments many such 
programmes in the US, orchestrated by different US administrations, e.g.  Specifically about 
InfraGard, the ACLU report argues that it may ‘turn private -sector corporations – some o f w hich 
maybe in a posit ion to observe the act ivities of millio ns o f individual customers – into surrogate 
eyes and ears for the FBI’.
The Progressive and formerly the ACLU Report also somewhat connect InfraGard to Operation 
TIPS - Terrorism Information and Prevent ion S ystem, an operati on designed by Presi dent George 
W. Bush to have United States cit izens report suspicious act ivity. Under Operat ion TIPS, 
transportation workers, utilit y crews and letter carriers could sign up to snoop on members o f their 
communities [Wikipedia Operation TIPS 2002 -08]. Operation TIPS came under intense scrutiny in 
July o f 2002, when the W ashington Post alleged in an editorial that the program was vaguely 
defined. Operation TIPS was accused of do ing an ‘end run’ around the United States Constitution, 
and the ori ginal wording of the websi te was subsequent ly changed. President Bush's former 
Attorney General, John Ashcroft denied that priv ate resi dences woul d be survey ed by private 
citizens operating as government spies. Mr . Ashcroft nonetheless defended the program, 
equivocating o n whether the reports by cit izens on fellow cit izens would be maintained in 
government databases. While saying that the informat ion would not be in a central database as part 
of Operation TIPS, he maintained that the information would still be kept in data bases by various 
law enforcement agencies [ibidem].  
The databases were an explicit concern o f var ious civil libert ies groups (on both the left and the 
right) who felt that such databases could include false informat ion about cit izens with no way for 
those citizens to know that such informat ion was compiled about them, nor any way for them to 
correct the information, nor any way for them to confront their accusers [ ibidem].
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5 Conclusions
Without any supporting conceptual work, the term Public Private Partn ership has been frequent ly 
advocated since the late ninet ies as a suitable way to cope with sensit ive informat ion sharing and 
other public-private interactions in the securit y area. PPP seems to be used as a label, attached to 
many different kinds of activities among public and private actors. 
Many governments postulate partnerships as an appropriate arrangement to overcome the gap in 
control and information deriving from the privatisation of infrastructures. This appears as preferable 
to other incent ives (e.g. economic), because it allows to retain a certain degree of control.  Private 
stakeholders also deem partnerships preferable to direct regulation [Andersson and Malm, 2006].  It 
remains to be seen whether the partnerships proposed by governments and e xpected by private 
actors coincide, and whether these partnerships will be co mpatible with the current legal framework 
for PPPs.
Mostly based on a co mpilation of public sources, this report has presented an overview o f so me 
proposed partnerships and applic ations of the PPP term in the securit y area, and has tried to point 
out the key issues that characterist ically such applicat ions invo lve. In substance, they regard the 
considerable, long effort and the strong commit ment needed to agree upon a common vocabu lary 
and a set of co mmonly agreed rules amo ng the interested communit y, and to gain the trust of 
individual participants so as to achieve crit ical mass. This effort is event stronger when partnerships 
are to be set up on an internat ional scene. However, when such an init ial effort was sustained – as it 
happened early in the US, under pressure o f exceptional events, by force o f t he cont inued 
commitment of the government under two subsequent administrations and of its federal securit y 
agencies, a different ty pe of concerns o f a mo re fundamental nature was raised: whether 
involvement of private contractors in securit y mat ters may vio late basic civil rights and in the end 
lead to an illiberal society. 
Quite notably, all this debate is quite far away from the ma in issues that PPP applications raised in 
other areas. These are most ly of an economic nature and pertain to estimating the risks of setting up 
a Public Private Partnership, selecting appropriate arrangements, and negotiat ing contracts in such a 
way as to protect the public interest and preserve open market access and co mpetition. When 
fundamental values are put at risk by PPP arrangements, they rather pertain to the sphere of market 
freedom and government credibility/reputation, than to the one of the basic civil rights. 
In addition, we have noted that this substantial difference may reflect a more basic inconsistency 
between most public -private arrangements in the securit y area and the commo nly agreed notion o f  
PPP as a ‘government service or private business venture which is funded and operated through a 
partnership of government and one or more private sector companies’ or ‘arrangements in which the 
private sector supplies infrastructure assets and services tradit ionally provided by governments’  
[Wikipedia PPI 2007 -08, Primer 2008]. The PPPs we have examined in the securit y area ma y 
indeed be intended to provide a public service in a broad sense (i.e., strengthening infrastructure 
resilience to potential attacks), but this service is not rigorously speci fied as it happens wit h 
conventional PPPs.
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